Socialist Organiser and the Eastern Bloc
Socialist Outlook1980sPaul StevensScanned print read by OCR, and not yet proofread: expect run-together words, dropped letters and, where a piece began partway down a page, a few lines of its neighbour. The printed page is the authority.
Introduction Marxism as a guide to action is above all practically and about preparing, theoretically, for crisis situations. When things are changing rapidly, Marxist tendencies will be tested by, among other things, their ability to keep their heads when all around are losing theirs. So it is now, with the chronic crisis and headlong rush to collapse of Soviet and East European Stalinism. Amid the chorus of pro-capitalist ideologists proclaiming the end of communism and the final defeat of socialism, many on the left are in utter disarray.
Marxism Today is verging on a final break with socialism of any kind. Erstwhile hard-line Stalinist Bert Ramelson now discovers that it's all down to a basic mistake by Lenin about democratic centralism.
Everywhere pro-market ideology is hardly challenged on the left, and proponents of workers power and socialist planning are regarded as weird ideological leftovers from an age of illusions.
The current around Socialist Organiser and its sister journal Workers Liberty havc, in a period roughly coinciding with the rise of Gorbachevism, been making their own re-evaluation of the Soviet Union and the other 'state monopoly societies'. They have not, let it be said night away, had any truck with the fashionable espousal of the market and general self-doubt about the validity of socialism. Rather, their rethinking has concentrated on the nature of these societies, rejecting their previous position on the nature of these societies were burcaucratic transitional societies ('deformed workers states'), in favour of of the view that they are new class societies. They have not come up with a commonly agreed theory of their own. Some of them believe they are bureaucratic collectivist societies, otbers that they are state capitalist. Not only have they made this re-evaluation, but they have engaged in a ceaseless, sometimes frantic, polemic against other political tendencies who bave not 'seen the light'. Of course this is an old debate. In the period when Stalinist role in Eastern Europe seems on the verge of final collapse, when the masses have tom down the Berlin wall and overthrown the monstrous Causescu regime, and when Soviet troops bave intervened on the streets of Baku, this debate might be seen - and generally is seen - as old fashioned, irrelevant, and almost bizarre. Certainly, the concrete tasks of solidarity with the masses in struggle against Stalinism, and the fight to help build a democratic socialist allerative in the East is the crucial task of the moment.
But, of course, how we see these events, how we judge the different tendencies, what conclusions Marxists draw about the overall trend of development - and hence - at least partially - what we say to the new democratic left in the Eastern bloc - is conditioned by our judgement about the character of the Stalinist societies.
Most crucially, this old theoretical dispute involves a different appraisal of the danger of the re-establishment of capitalism. As we shall see, Socialist Organiser regard the Eastern bloc as embodying no social gains, nothing historically progressive, for the working people of the world. Indeed, in some of their writings there is the suggestion that in some ways these are historically regressive vis-a-vis capitalism. Clearly then, while for SO the re-establishment of capitalism in these states is far from being the best outcome, it would be by no means a disaster compared with the alternative of continued Stalinist rule.
We disagree profoundly with any such assessment. While the experience of the mass movement against Stalinism is itself an important gain for workers everywhere - and only on the basis of this is there the possibility of the overthrow of the Stalinist bureaucracy - if the outcome is the restoration of capitalism it would be a world-historic disaster. Imagine what would be the situation were capitalism to be triumphally restored in the Soviet Union and Easter Europe.
First, capitalist production would be reintroduced on the basis of destroying the real social gains - in tens of job security, social services, bealth care, rhythm of work - which the masses in these countries have won Eastern Europe would be a pool of cheap labour but - unlike the third world - with a highly skilled and educated work force. It would be a source of massive imperialist super-profits. It is not the 'West Germanisation' of the East which would follow, but the 'Argentinianisation' or 'Brazilianisation' of these debt-laden countries. Penury, austerity and vast exploitation would be the price paid by the workers. Such a scenario - which could be a vital source of a new wave of capitalist accumulation to break out of the long period of semi-crisis - would be a dagger pointed at the beart of the West European trade union movement. The threat of relocation of production would be ruthlessly wielded to force down the price of labour in the west.
On a world scale, the price paid for any restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union would be immense. Nicaragua and Cuba would be carly victims; otbers would follow. Imperialism triumphant, especially US imperialism, would wreak an orgy of revenge against its opponents in the third world. New inter-imperialist conflicts would much more easily turn into wars.
Just contemplating the disastrous consequences of the restoration of capitalism reveals the fact that the very existence of post-capitalist states, despite everything, is a vital component of the political relationship of forces on a world scale.
But, if you say (and we at least do) ibal the post-capitalist societies are in some way an obslacle to imperialism, is to say they are in some way different, in some way progressive to the capitalist states. This is precisely the question al issue. Fortunately, the restoration of capitalism is far from being the only possible outcome of the current crisis. But the main obstacle is not the technical one of privatising the state-ised economies, which can easily be done over time. Rather, it is the resistance of the working class itself.
The fundamental question is whether the Stalinist bureaucracy has so discredited socialism, that the workers will, albeit grudgingly, finally accept the logic of capitalist restoration as inevitable. Obviously, the continued rule of tbe bureaucracy in its present fom is incompatible with the restoration of capitalism. Equally obviously, whole sections of the bureaucracy may attempt to find a niche in a new capitalist system if that is the only alterative 1o total oblivion.
Either way, the bureaucracy - for example tbrough the new deal with the IMF in Poland which will turn impoverishment into destitution - prepares the way for crushing the resistance of the workers. But while the working class will surely fight austerity, in the medium or long term that will not be enough to prevent the social catastrophe of capitalist restoration. Only if a democratic socialist alternative emerges which is strong enough to contest for the leadership of the working class against pro-capitalist currents, can a socialist outcome be posed.
This altemative will have to build on and extend the social gains of the masses under bureaucratic rule; it means replacing the centralised bureaucratic planning system with a democratically planned economy; but it means preserving and building on all the social welfare gains of the masses in the Eastern bloc. To build such an alterative means a fight against the privatisation of industry, against the sell-off of assets to transnational corporations. Already some struggles along these lines have taken place in Poland; but there are other examples where state property (like the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk, or the Tungstram electric works in Budapest) are being Where workers have resisted the sell-off and asset stripping of state property, we say they are absolutely right. Indeed, for many east European workers defence of state property against the encroachment of individual capitalists seems an elementary duty. If bureaucratic privilege seems obscene to them, so does private ownership of the means of production. Like the workers in a Warsaw helicopter factory who successfully resisted its sale to Fiat, we say that defense of state property against imperialist encroachment is correct. But then property relations rellect something at the heart of any social system: it would be interesting to know what Socialist Organiser think about this problem.
Trotsky, as early as The Revolution Betrayed, posed the allerative as 'either political revolution, or a return to capitalism'. His timescale, as we know, was telescoped. But his basic perspective was not wrong. His own critique of the economy under Stalinism pointed out all the main consequences of bureaucratic waste, inefficiency,lack of innovative dynamism, which are so familiar to us today.
Since Trotsky's classic, the states which emerged, directly or indirectly from the October revolution and the Chinese revolution, have seen both horrible repression and irrationality and tremendous social progress. For Socialist Organiser, on the other hand, this tragic history has resulted in nothing positive in tbese states: only 'totalitarianism, barbarism' and a population reduced to 'modern slaves'. Their theoretical and political volte face will disorientate them in the face of the new opportunities - and grave dangers - which face the workers of the Easter bloc.
CHINA The bloody brutality with which the Chinese bureaucrats put down the rebellion of the workers and students last summer shocked the entire world. No better example could be given of the utter ruthlessness with which the Stalinist bureaucracy is prepared to defend its social and political power. But there were features of the rebellion which Socialist Organiser's new class ideas cannot explain.
In its universally agreed by serious observers of every political viewpoint that there was a complete absence of calls for the restoration of capitalism. The commitment of the workers and students to socialist democracy was shown in the fact that their anthem was the 'Internationale' and their emblem the red flag. Their demands were aimed against the 'marketisation' reforms of Deng and Zbao Ziyang, with their consequent undermining of job security, increased inequality and rampant corruption at the top of the party and government apparatus.
The real drama of the fight against the troops who invaded Beijing to crush the rebellion was not so much in Tienanmin Square itself - where the world's press was concentrated - but at the barricades in the working class areas which the troops had to breach to get to the square. The workers mobilised in their tens of thousands to defend the democracy movement agains! the repression. Jt was on these barricades that the vast majority of the deaths occurred But even as the tanks mowed them down, the workers chanted 'China, China' and 'long live the Republic". Was this, as some bourgeois commentators have suggested, Chinese patriotism or mindless nationalism ? We think not. Or rather, if it was patriotism, it was of a very special type. The workers were expressing their allegiance to the gains of the revolution, to the relative equality, job security and gains in terms of living standards, health care etc which the proletarian and peasant masses of China have experienced since the revolution. This is the source of their pride in 'China' and 'the Republic'.
Socialist Organiser say they are no longer 'defencist' as regards the the so-called socialist countries; they do not think there are social gains in these countries to defend against Western imperialism. Of course, it we understand their position correctly, they like the SWP, would defend China if attacked by US impenalism on the grounds of national self-determination, but not on the basis that China is a form of social organisation more progressive than that in capitalist countrics. In Workers Liberty no I1, in their introduction to the writings of Shachtman, they say that the "stale-monopoly' societies are 'broadly parallel to capitalism in the development of the productive forces'. That is plain enough. But is it true ? If the criterion that there are no social advantages for the masses in the 'state monopoly" countries is valid at all, then it must be valid for China, the world's most populous country. Unfortunately it is not true: it is just plain ridiculous. The overthrow of capitalism, and the expulsion of imperialism, in China - led by a bereaucratic Stalinist party - has led to immense gains for the Chinese people.
Despite the ruthlessness of the regime, despite all the crimes and waste of bureaucratic nule, the Chinese revolution immediately bettered the position of the peasants and, especially, of the working class. National planning, the creation of a single national market, the development of industrialisation, the development of bealth care, job security (the so-called "iron rice bowl"), the huge steps forward in education - all these things are products of the revolution. There is an important comparison which can easily be made, that between the devclopment of India since 1947 (independence from Britain) and China since 1949 (victory of the revolution). Both countries remain poor countries, based on agriculture - although both countries have developed an important industrial sector (China more rapidly than India). But in terms of the social gains of the masses, there is no contest. Measured by any conceivable criterion - calories consumed per day, literacy, longevity, health provision - the masses have made vast strides compared with India. Who ever heard of an "iron rice bowl' amongst the starving masses of the Indian sub-continent: the very notion is a joke. And what is the crucial difference between China and India? India achieved independence via the victory of a bourgeois nationalist leadership, the Congress Party, tied hand and foot to imperialism. China broke with imperialism via a social revolution, however bureaucratic and authoritarian its jeaders, which crealed new social relations of production, overthrew the landlords and the capitalists, and established a regime characterised by genuine national, but bureaucratic, economic planning You've got to be blind, or befuddled by 'new class' ideology not to see the social progress which this represents. In other words, despite the threat to these gains represented by the new economic course of the Chinese government, there is something to defend in the social formation established by the revolution. We are not neutral on the 'marketisation' reforms of the Deng-Zhao Ziyang bureaucracy. We do not regard it as a matter of indifference if capitalism is restored in The logic of Socialist Organiser's position is that the restoration of capitalism is a matter of no concern. How can it be if there is nothing progressive in the new post- 1949 regime ? But this is an absurd position, and it leads 1o contradicting the Chinese workers who object vehemently, who have organised dozens and dozens of strikes, and taken to the streets in protest, precisely against the marketisation reforms of the bureaucracy, and the attack on tbeir living standards which this involves. As a matter of fact, once you say you are opposed to marketisation, or the restoration of capitalism, then you are saying that there is something progressive in the social relations of production established by the revolution. It doesn't matter if you give its a new name, like bureaucratic collectivism or state capitalism, there is something progressive about it to defend against imperialism.
So, maybe a convincing case can be made out for the Chinese revolution having given the masses of that country manifold benefits, with all the limitations of political regime we have outlined. But what about the Soviet Union itself?
Surely its economy is in a mess, and surely it is technologically way behind the United States? In fact the social progress made by the regime which came out of the October revolution is barely discussed by Socialist Organiser. They say (SO 372): 'Look at South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand and it is hard 1o argue that China, Vietnam and Nor Korca could not have developed on a markei-capitalist basis.'
There is a double, or triple, slight of hand involved here. The four countries they mention are indeed examples of post-war economic growth in the capitalist world. While they are not the only ones, there are plenty of examples of capitalist regimes which have not seen spectacular economic growth, an inevitable result of the anarchy and uneven development of capitalist production. But is it really serious 10 ask, in determining the economic and social progress of the post-capitalist regimes to quote four examples of relatively small capitalist countries and say your case is proved.
In the first place, irrespective of where the Soviet Union is today in relation to the USA, would the economic development, the industrialisation, which that country saw until well into the 1970s have occurred without the October revolution? Irrespective of what has happened in Taiwan, would the extraordinary economic development of China, with all the difficulties and tragedies which we know about, have bappened without the 1949 revolution? To say 'yes' is 1o both give international imperialism great credit, and to go off into the realms of The October revolution did occur, and on the basis of the property relations it created, so did massive economic development. The Chinese revolution did occur, with gigantic social and economic progress. Against that historical evidence, Socialist Organiser are content to say it is hard to argue' that things would not have been otherwise has imperialism kept its grip In addition to going off into the realms of historical speculation, Socialist Organiser add another revision to Marxist theory - a complete junking of the theory of permanent revolution. For Trotsky argued that 1l was only on the basis of the dictatorship of the proletarial, of breaking with imperialist domination that the road to autonomous industrialisation could be opened. The Soviet Union and China have verified his theory in a spectacular way. On the basis of SO's speculations Trotsky's permanent revolution was a senseless theory - because imperialism would have developed these countries anyway! Conclusion? If SO are right, then the Russian and Chinese revolutions were a massive historical detour, literally an historical wasted experience which has largely been negative, leading to massively oppressive and retrograde societies. perhaps only the experience of the first few years of the Russian revolution were worthwhile, for they showed what Soviet power could be like. But this, in the light of SO's theories, must be a debatable point.
After all, didn't the Soviet Union under Lenin lead directly to Stalinism, this new 'barabarism'? Maybe it would have been better not to seize power, 1o wait - like the mensheviks said - for the working class to develop in strength so that a more classical revolution occurred? We eagerly await SO's clarification on this point.
But, let us remember, the anarchists have always said thal there was no justification for the Bolshevik revolution at all: it was just a Blanquist putsch which led to dictatorship. Maybe SO are starting to think the self-same thing. If it is premature to claim they have reached this conclusion on Russia (although they surely will) it flows directly out of their positions that they already reached this conclusion about China. For SO, in the Chinese Peoples republic there is nothing to defend - and there never was.
Lastly, we absolutely defy Socialist organiser to claim there is nothing of social benefit for the masses of Cuba from the revolution which overthrew Batista and capitalism with him. is a life expectancy higher than Britain and indeed every other Latin American stale actually something to do with throwing out imperialism? Or bas there been a marked improvement in the climate since 1959? Is Russia imperialist?
Socialist organiser hasn't hesitated to take the logic of its 'new class' theories to their logical conclusion. In SO no 371 they state:
"The conflicts between the USSR and Wester Powers 1945, and the foreseeable conflicts between them in the future, have been and will be essentially inter-imperialist conflicts about rival claims for spheres of influence and areas of domination - not clashes about the principle of nationalised property.' This is an extraordinary claim. It is backed up by the notion (SO 371) that:
'You can deny that the USSR is imperialism only by saying that imperialism is only the form of state-monopoly imperialism described by Lenin and nothing else. And that would be to deny the existence of the Athenian and Roman, and Spanish and Ottoman empires, or indeed the British empire for all but 70 or so years of its 300-year life. The conflict between the US and USSR is chiefly about competition for splieres of influence and control, rather than a dispute of market cconomy versus nationalised economy. This is a much more audacious theory of 'Soviet imperialism' than that put forward by Tony Cliff and the SWP. They at least tried to maintain that there is some sort of economic competition between East and West, that based on competition between 'USSR Lad' and western imperalism, which funds its expression in the arms race. Socialist Organiser seem to be denying that it is economic competition between Western and Soviet imperialism, but rather it is competition for "spheres of influence'.
But hang on a minute! What interest has the Soviet bureaucracy got in finding new 'spheres of influence" against the West. If it is a new ruling class, governing a new exploiting society, then presumably it wants to expand its spheres of influence, as did the Ottoman,Roman and British empires, in order 10 expand the revenues, the tribute, the imperialist booty to be gained from its domination of these spheres of influence! Is this not a characteristic of every single form of pre-capitalist and post-capitalist imperialism? So, it turns out to be economic competition after all: competition between the imperialist monopolies who want to rob the semi-colonial world and dependent countries via imperialist super-profits, and the Soviet bureaucracy who want to exploit their 'colonies' via the extraction of surplus labour in the state-monopoly, folalitarian system.
This of course is interesting, but factually untrue. Let us concede one thing: after the second world war the Soviet Union stupped eastem Europe of its industrial machinery, even whole factories, as 'reparations' to boost the Soviet economy. But over the whole forty-five years since the end of the second world war you will search high and low for evidence of massive capital and profit flows from the Soviet Union's allies to the Soviet Union itself. A brief look at Comecon, the economic body which regulates economic relations between the easter European countries, the USSR and Cuba, will prove this point.
In fact, there is a great deal of evidence that there is a net economic loss to the USSR in its trade relations with these countries. It provides huge amounts of raw materials, for example coal, oil and gas, to these countries at prices well below the world market price. While perhaps not every Soviet deal with Comecon countries is to the advantage of those state, overall the USSR trades with these countries at lower prices than it charges on the world market. And of course in relation to Cuba, its trade has run since 1960 at a huge deficit which has allowed that country to maintain itself against the imperialist economic blockade. Now all this, surely, is not part of the intrinsic internationalist generosity of the Soviet Union. Far political calculation: to maintain bureaucratic rule in these countries, to prevent a restoration of capitalism, 1o shore up the international military, strategic and political position of the Soviet bureaucracy itself. There you are! Spheres of influence! our Socialist organiser comrades will say. Yes indeed; the Soviet bureaucracy is concerned to maintain crucial outposts to defend the USSR, or more precisely to defend its own rule in the Soviet Union. This is what explains the occupation of easter Europe after the Second World War, and its readiness to help Cuba after 1960. It also explains its completely opportunist and unprincipled relations with countries like Ethiopia under the Dergue regime, which provides the Soviet Union with important naval facilities, or with Assad's Syria which was seen, at least in the past, as a conduit for Soviet 'influence' in the Middle East. It also explains the completely unjustified and criminal invasion of Afghanistan, a country in which political developments were seen as a direct threal to the Soviet bureaucracy. All this is completely true. But does it amount to imperialism? Not unless you conclude that there is a new form of imperialism, which unlike the Roman, Ottoman and British empires does not aim at the systematic plunder of countries within the 'sphere of influence'. A new, 'non-economic', imperialism - an interesting innovation in historical materialism, but one that is theoretically worthless.
There is another rather nasty conclusion of SO's ideas that the conflict between east and West is an ier-imperialist contest. It conforms very well with the notion of 'Russian expansionism', and the cold war ideology of those who have justified the armis race with the idea that the Russian tanks were just itching to burst through the West German border and swamp Western Europe.
This idea was always ridiculous; the notion of the Russian threat has what has justified every single action of nuclear escalation by the West, when the bureaucracy bad absolutely no objective interest in invading Westem Europe and starting a war at all "Yes' will say our Socialist organiser critics the Soviet Union couldn't afford a nuclear war, so of course they bad no intention of invading Western Europe!' But then, that's exactly the point we're making. Once you concede that it is the threat of nuclear annihilation which has kept back the Russian tanks, and stopped the red paratroopers landing in East Anglia, then you have conceded the cold warmongers' arguments, Cruise, Pershing and sinker!
We could go further: might it not be the case that as well as 'defending the peace' the US nuclear weapons have kept West European workers from being enslaved by Soviet totalitarianism? The reduction ad absurdum of the 'Russian imperialism' argument may be outrageous, but it is an inescapable anti-communist cold-war logic. It flows directly from the idea of a new exploiting 'imperialist' class.
More radically absurd in the SO theory is that the conflict between east and West has not been a conflict about nationalised property. They say:
"The conflict between the US and the USSR is chiefly about competition for spheres of influence and control, rather than a dispute about the market economy versus nationalised property. (SO372)
It is hard to understand what is meant by this. The victory of Western imperialism in the Eastern bloc would mean the re-establishment of capitalisni, ie the abolition of nationalised property relations. The victory of the Cuban revolution mean throwing out the United Fruit Company, ITT, Bell and the other US private multinationals. The rule of the bureaucracy presupposes the existence of nationalised property relations; its rule is incompatible with privale capitalist relations of production. In so far as tbe West and the Soviet Union have been 'competing' for spheres of influence, to use the terminology of SO, then of course the nationalised property relations of the easter bloc have - altbough this is partially changing with the advent of Gorbachevism - acted as a barrier, an obstacle to the penetration of Western capital. This is simply, as we have said, because the Soviel bureaucracy relies upon the nationalised property relations to maintain its power: the restoration of capitalism means the end of its power.
Let us turn the examples around. There is hardly anywhere in the world that the US has more under its 'sphere ofinfluence' than the Philippines, although we quote dozens of similar examples. but the three huge US military bases on those islands (influence and control' par excellence!) go hand-in-hand with direct economic control of at least 40 per cent of all Philippino economic activity - and, according to the World Bank, the absolute impoverishment of at least 20 per cent of the population. Doesn't the supposed conflict over areas of political influence and control have something to do with the type of economy, the character of the social relations in the states concerned?! SO's insistence that the Soviet Union is "imperialist' leads them to deny the most elementary facts of social and political rcality.
What does the 'workers state' theory actually say?
One of the features of Socialist Organiser's polemics is its (extremely) loose characterisation of what those who hold 'workers statist' theories actually say about the post-capitalist societies, what our real characterisation of them is. In particular, Socialist Organiser repeatedly say that the charactersation "transitional society' means that these societies are 'on the way' to socialism, with a socialist economy but a bureaucratic political regime. In view of these loose definitions, and Sean Matgamna's view that workers statists are 'soft Stalinists', it is worth explaining what workers state theories actually are In the first place, unless we are anarchists or anarcho-syndicalists, we must admit that bureaucratically deformed workers state can exist. Lenin held that the Soviet Union was a 'workers state with bureaucratic deformations'. Even Tony Chiff admits that Russia was a workers state, albeit bureaucratically deformed, until 1928-9. If you want to use the criterion of the self-government by the Soviets, then it is hard to agrue that the Soviet Union was really a workers state, by this ideal programmatic norm, after 1921.
Trotsky held that the Soviet Union was 'transitional' in the sense that it combined a non-capitalist economic base, that of nationalised property with "bourgeois norms of distribution', and a bureaucratic social and political regime. It could either end its development in the working class overthrowing the bureaucracy and establishing more-or-less healthy forms of political and social rule, or il could result in the collapse of the bureaucratic regime, which would signify the restoration of capitalism. There was never any suggestion in his theory of transitional society that the victory of political revolution was automatic or inevitable. That depended above all on the progress of the working class revolution world-wide. His whole approach was governed by Lenin's notion that 'unless the world revolution comes to our aid we are •Workers statists' have never said that the nationalised poverty relations characteristic of the posi-capitalist states are socialist. Bureaucratic national planning, as opposed to planning based on direct workers democracy, deforms the economic development of these societies, and creates a specific, bybrid set of social relations of production, which are neither socialist nor capitalist, but - transitional. Does this amount to a new 'historic' mode of production which we can compare with capitalism, feudalism or indeed the social relations which will exist in a future world socialist republic - which itsell presupposes the victory of socialist revolution in a number, at least, of the advanced capitalist countries? The answer is "Do'. Those who consider that the Soviet Union, and similar states, represent a new stable mode of production, with a new ruling class characteristic of this mode of production (as the bourgeoisie is characteristic of the capitalist mod of production) are whistling in the wind. In fact, they concede far 1oo many compliments to the bureaucracy!
The evidence for their theory cannot be, at most, more than about 60 years of historical experience, an extremely short period to establish the definite establishment of a totally new mode of production. And has not the historical outcome of that experience, from Gorbachev to Poland, Irom Hungary to China, show us the relative fragility of that rule, its lack of deep historical roots, ils failure to stablise itself? That at least is our conclusion. We would add a further question: is not all the contemporary evidence that the historical alteratives to the crisis of bureaucratic rule are either socialist democracy and workers self-rule or the restoration of capitalism?
In our view there is a generalised crisis of bureaucratic rule in the post-capitalist states, and we shall explain below our opinion of its causes. But there is no doubt in our minds that we are seeing burcaucratic rule come slap bang up against its inberent limits. The economic growth of the last period is tuming into crisis and decay. Despite the overall more socially progressive character of the socio-economic system vis-a-vis capitalism, it has not been capable of establishing itself as an historically solidified mode of production. It is a hybrid system, like some of the societies in the period of transition from feudalism to capitalism - containing important elements of social progress but inherently unstable from an historical point of view. The bureaucracy is not a ruling class because its privileges are dependent on a form of social relations, nationalised property, which are inimical to the stablisation of its rule and the stabilisation of an alternative mode of production to capitalism or socialism. These property relations are also inherently inimical to the of the stabilisation of a definite and prolonged social role for the bureaucracy through ownership of the means of production. Such ownership' could only come abour through the bureaucracy trying to become part of a new capitalist class in a capitalist restoration, which in the last analysis would also mean the destruction of bureaucratic rule.
Socialist Organiser have been keen to reject any idea tbat their view of a 'new exploiting society' is "pessimistic", because, as they put it, during the growth of this 'new exploiting society' the working class, and thus the potential for socialism, has also grown. This is a pretty weak argument. Once you say, like Socialist Organiser, that there are 'new exploiting societies' with a 'new ruling class', then you are lumbered, willy billy, with an utterly pessimistic conclusion. Out of the working class struggle against imperialist capitalism, from the end of the First World War onwards, a new mode of production, as exploitative as capitalism if not worse, has grown up and stabilised itself. The epoch of imperialism has not turned out to be, as Lenin held it would be, 'the epoch of the transition to socialism', but on the contrary, the epoch of the growth of bureaucratic collectivism (Matgamna) or the epoch of state capitalism (Martin Thomas). And any one who thinks otherwise is, naturally, a 'soft Stalinist'.
Worse than capitalism ?
is broadly similar to that of capitalism. But beneath say:
nany respects from capitalism and in man! undamental respects - notably what they do thi vorking class and its possibilities of ( wed from his basic incoherence on the place of sta nopoly systems in history - we bave of course sympathy. (why not? PS)
The articles which Workers Liberty has printed from Shachtman as crucial for understanding the modern world, describes the inbabitants of the bureaucratic societies as 'moder slaves' and those societies themselves as 'barbarism'.
The logic of this kind of thinking, publicly defended relation to any of the post-capitalist societies. The restoration of capitalism in Cuba (which could only take place, let us note, on the basis of mass slaughter of whole sectors of the working class) would be a matter of indifference. In fact, it might end up being a more progressive society, if unions got the right to organise.
Again, the Vietnamese workers and peasants fought all those years against American imperialism, against the semi-fascist gangsters like Thieu and Ky who the Americans paid as their hirelings, only to establish a regime no better than capitalism. And let's be clear about it - if by some historical mischance the apartheid out to be worse than apartheid!
'regressive'
presumption that 'capitalism' equals the bourgeois democracies where there are extensive freedoms for e working class to organise. This of course cove aly a fraction of the inhabitants of the capital countries, which has no tack of barbaric regimes. Ir what way, SO should tell us, are the workers of th Soviet Union more repressed than the workers of E Salvador, or Colombia, or Indonesia or Chile? In wha exact manner are the Polish workers in 1989 more *slaves' than the workers in Guatemala or Haiti? Even at the level of formal democratic rights, the theory doesn't make sense, much less at the level of a comparison of social relations of production.
The Contradictions of Gorbachevism What then does Gorbachevism represent? How does it fit into the crisis of the post-capitalist states and how can we characterise it from a socialist point of view? The Gorbachev reforms are a response by the Soviet bureaucracy to the economic impasse which the Soviet Union (and similar states) are now finding themselves in. This impasse consists in the fact that whereas the command economies like Stalin's Russia registered extremely fast economic growth when it was a question of completing the basic task of industrialisation, and for a period afterwards when growth was centred on the development of heavy industry, such economies have shown themselves to be completely incapable of meeting the challenge of sustaining economic growth in the contemporary period, of boosting the living standards of the masses on the basis of the most modern technology. To put anotber way, the Soviet Union under the system of bureaucratic planning was extremely good at extensive growth, but has been extremely bad at intensive growth. How can we explain this impasse? The crisis of bureaucratic planning bas foundered on the inability of the centralised command system to successfully compete in the field of the most modem technology. It is good at repetitive and predictable tasks with established technology, but bad at innovation, dynamism, creating new products and ways of organising production. Why?
Capitalism continually, as Marx said 140 years ago. has to 'revolutionise' production as firms compete to win a greater share of surplus value (profits). The most technologically advanced companies can win a greater share of profits ("technological rents') by reducing the cost of production, the average amount of labour power it takes to make each product. Of course, the dynamic and innovative side of capitalism is disrupted by its periodic crises, its anarchy, its unplanned character. But once an economic upswing occurs, there is an in-built bias towards innovation and technological progress.
In the Soviet Union the planned economy was capable of remarkable feats in the field of industrialisation, and even in some advanced fields of science like space travel and medicine. But there is no in-built tendency towards innovation, precisely because of the waste-ridden and bureaucratic character of centralised bureaucratic planning. It is difficult to make rapid scientific advance when photocopiers are only viable at the discretion of the KGB, and when 'plan fullfilmen!' - real or imagined has more social status than efficiency and rationality in production. Gorbachev's answer to this crisis has been "perestroika' - the marketisation reforms aiming to do away with the worst inefficiencies of the bureaucratic system. But in order to mobilise a social bloc behind his project and against the conservatism of sections of the bureaucracy Gorbachev has coupled his perestroika with glasnost - a limited democratisation. This is aimed at winning the allegiance of the technocrats, the intellectuals and at least a section of tbe working class.
The contradiction of this dual process, glasnost and perestroika can be summed up in a single phrase: wherever an economic "liberalisation' takes place it ends up attacking the working class; but wherever a political liberalisation takes place, it creates opportunities for the working class to move forward and 'outflank' the liberalisers. This phenomenon was noted by Marx as long ago as 1848.
Imperialism and the 'dual role' of the bureaucracy Once you have decided, as has Socialist Organiser, that the 'state monopoly societies' have created a new mode of production, a new exploitative type of society, then you have to make an assessment of the economic system. For us character of the world 'workers statists', , the world system is that of imperialism, in which inroads have been made by the nationalised economies. These economies, although they come under heavy pressure from world economy, have partially broken from the law of value as the key derminant of the allocation of investments, the division of the social surplus and indeed, to a greater or lesser extent, pricing of consumer and producer goods. ]t will make a big difference whether SO decide that these societies are 'state capitalist' or 'bureaucratic collectivist'. If they are the former, then they represent just a modification within the general world capitalist economy; if the latter, then they represent a new departure from world capitalism, and probably a regressive one.
Up until the 1980s, all state capitalist and bureaucratic collectivist theorists made much of the alleged 'convergence' of the major economies towards statisation. Bruno Rizzi, first systematic theoriser of the theory of bureaucratic collectivism, called his book 'La Bureaucratisation du Monde' (the bureaucratisation of the world) in which he posited the growing together of bureaucratic societies, both capitalist and non-capitalist, towards a uniform bureaucratic exploitative system. Mike Kidron and Tony Cliff, who systematised 'stale capitalist' theory in Britain, talked frequently of the growing 'statisation' of industry in the capitalist world. The implication of both theories was that the differences between 'ordinary' capitalist countries and the planned economies were becoming fewer and fewer. Both sets of tbeories could be argued when the Keynesian welfare state, with heavy 'indicative planning' by state economic agencies predominaled, existed. Equally, when fascism seemed to be the coming thing among capitalist states, there seemed a rationale for such theories. But in the epoch of privatisation and a sharp decrease in the economic role of the state in advanced capitalism, this theory of 'convergence' now seems ludicrous.
crisis in the centralised planned economies, it is more obvious than ever that there is a sharp contradiction and divergence between economies based on nationalised property relations and those based on free enterprise capitalism.
This relates to Trotsky's theory of the 'dual nature' of the bureaucracy. After the defcat of the German Communist party by Hitler's Nazis in 1933, Trotsky concluded that the Soviet bureaucracy had become "counter-revolutionary through and through' and gone over the the world imperialist order. Concretely this mean that internationally the Soviet Union acted as a barrier to the extension of the revolution, seing a revolution in any country as a threat to the stability of the international order, and hence to its own rule. "Peaceful coexistence', which in one form or anotber has been the policy of the bureaucracy since at least 1935, meant objectively collaborating with imperialism 1o maintain the world status quo. Incidentally, this peaceful coexistence role of the bureaucracy fits ill with the allegations of Socialist Organiser of the expansionist, imperialist, characterof the Soviet Union, but leave that aside.
But Trotsky clained there was another side of the Soviet bureaucracy, which gave it a 'dual nature' - the bureaucracy was forced to defend collectivised property relations. He says:
"The function of Stalin …....has a dual character. Stalin serves the bureaucracy and thus the world bourgeoisie; but he cannot serve the bureaucracy without defending the social foundation which the bureacracy exploits in its own interests. To that extent does does Stalin defend nationalised property from imperialist attacks and from too impatient and avaricious layers of the bureaucracy itsell.' (Nietber a Bourgeois nor a Workers State?', Writings 37/8 p.65) In other words, the privileges of the bureaucracy can exist only insofar and so long as nationalised property relations exist. That is why, in its own bureaucratic way, the bureaucracy defends those relations. Equally, the overwhelming weight of Trotsky's writings on the possibility of social counter-revolution in the Soviet Union repeated time and time again: either the workers will overthrow the bureaucracy or there will be a return to capitalism, social counter-revolution will triumph. He did not, in the vast bulk of his writings on the subject, expect that bureaucratic degeneration would lead to new, stable, bureaucratic collectivist societies. In the very work we quoted above be makes clear:...'be (Stalin) carries through this defense (of nationalised property) with methods which prepare the general destruction of Soviet society.' And we are justified in asking today: is this not the real choice which icnreasingly confronts countries like Poland and Hungary? Is not the real alternative to workers revolution the destruction of collectivised property relations and the re-establishment of capitalism? Obviously this is the perspective. And if this occurs, how will messrs Matgamna and Thomas see it? Progress? The freeing of the 'modern slaves' from their bureaucratic slavemasters? Or will it be in reality a giant step backwards and a massive victory for imperialism? Trotsky repeats that 'the bureaucracy must be overthrown by the proletariat. This is not a task it can sub-contract to imperialism."
We have insisted that the social and economic power of the bureaucracy is based on collectived property relations precisely because events in Poland, China and Hungary might give the impression that the bureaucracy itself favours the restoration of capitalism, or is 'pro-capitalist". It is as well to be precise on this issue. While it may be the case that certain very highly placed bureaucrats can, through swindling and corruption, accumulate enough capital to set themselves up as independent capitalists, the bucreacracy as a social caste cannot do this en mass. This is a structural impossibility which would assume the personal accumulation, through cash, stocks and bonds of the social surplus in these countries.
It is precisely the fact that this doesn't happen, that the social priveleges of the bureaucracy are not based on property ownership, which makes them a caste and not a class. Control of the accumulation process, and bence the manifold opportunities for social privilege and pilfering, does not mean that the bureaucracy can directly dispose of the surplus as if wishes and according to its individual, private, plans. That's why it is not a 'state capitalist', or any other type of social class. If in China, for example, a layer of the bureaucracy was indeed able to turn themselves into private capitalists, they would strive to ensure the destruction of the bureaucratic system as a whole. This could not be done without political counte-revolution and probably civil war, in which a section of the bureaucracy - that without private capital - would contest the social overtum.
In Poland today (August 1989) the bureaucracy, while bringing non-Communists inlo the government to belp ensure the establishment of an austerity regime, bolds the army and the security apparatuses as the guarantor against the overtum of socialised property relations.
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The theory and the 'name tag'
Socialist Organiser, in a section of their pamphlet entitled 'How to discuss' argue that what is important is the 'substantive theory' and not the 'name tag'. In his context they argue that the SWP s theory of stat apitalism' in reality conceals a variety of differer theories, and that undercath the "bureaucratised workers states" theory is a variety of bureaucratic collectivism.
What is certainly true is that SO bave not yet developed a substantive theory of the post-capitalist societies, and thai underlies its hesitancy about adopting a 'name tag'. Of course, SO are right that substantive theory is more important than labels, but definitions and codifications are important in hemselves. Trotsky's deinitions did in fact flow from a substantive theory of the Soviet Union as a 'transitional society', a theory which has been developed and amplified by, among oters, Erest Mandel (see for example 'Marxist Economic Theory; "Revolutionary Marxism Today' and his arcles in Critique no 3 (autumn 1974) not to metion his recent book 'Beyond perestroika').
f SO lack a substantive theory about the laws o notion of this new exploiting society which they ser there is nothing to defend. Here they are quile right to 'orthodox trotskyists' of the Fourth International and Trolsky himself by inference - in that we do in fact see something progressive in these socielies, social and economic gains for the masses. In the end though, what does it matter? Don't we both sland for the programmeof workers powers, for the revolutionary overthrow of the bureaucracy, for miles, drie pace Dobes we otis stand for the ollers. s international republic of the self-governing workers, for international socialism? Indeed we do. And because we do, SO should immediately withdraw their monstrous slander against us, and by inference against the memory of Trotsky, thal we are 'soft Stalinists'. Equally, they should abandon the ridiculous theory that post-1951 trotskyism is in fact : Brandier criticised Stalin's 'Brandlerism'
international policy, but defended, in the early 1930s anyway, his domestic policies. Please tell us comrades of Socialist Organiser, where exactly has the Fourth International or any of its Icaders at any time whatever said that the domestic policies of the Soviet Union, China or the other post-capitalist states S6? Czechoslovakia '68 were correct? Hungary China 1989? The accusation of 'Brandlerism' is jus But what substantive theory you have of the post-capitalist states is important in order to orientate yourself in relation to the gigantic world-historic events shaking the post-capitalist world. The oulcome of the crisis of the bureaucracy is vitally important. What the Western left says to dissident forces is absolutely crucial. And we should not be saying that marketisation, a retum to capitalism, is a matter of indifference vis-a-vis the bureaucratic system they live under. Neither can we be socially neutral between the post-capitalist states and imperialism. we are not neutral on marketisation. capialism, imperialism.
Defence of the gains of the masses in the post-capitalist states is the platform from wbich to launch an assault which will end up overthrowing the bureaucracy and establishing workers power.